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ABSTRACT. Recent scholarship has firmly established the similarities between Arendt and Fou-
cault, in particular with regard to the dangers of late-modern social processes. Yet, few have com-
pared their accounts of resistance. This paper argues that although Foucault offers the more com-
prehensive account, it omits the encounter with the other as unique and unfathomable, which is 
central to Arendt’s. This omission is particularly striking given the authors’ shared belief that the 
danger of ‘the social’ and ‘governmentality’ lies in atomizing individuals and barring the devel-
opment of a singular style of being, and their allusion to friendship and solidarity as sites of re-
sistance. 
Drawing on Arendt, I show how Foucault restricts his thematization of solidarity and friend-
ship to a reflexive praxis of the subject on her own limits, and argue instead for the relational 
dimension of resistance. I start by reconstructing their converging analysis of biological racism. I 
then continue with a discussion of resistance in Arendt, which she develops in response to the 
Shoah. More specifically, she provides a concept of solidarity and friendship that I draw on to 
extend Foucault’s analysis of the transnational solidarity among the governed in fighting for their 
rights vis-à-vis their governments; and of friendship in the context of his interrogation of the 
LGBT-movement. 
Keywords: Resistance, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), solidarity, friendship, philosophy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The growing literature on Arendt and Foucault has highlighted the striking similarities 
between the two thinkers.1 In particular, they agree on the danger of late-modern social 
dynamics that lead, by violent coercion but also by non-violent forms of normalization, to 
uniform yet isolated individuals: totalitarianism (which expanded into the critique of the 
‘social’) in Arendt, and biopolitics (which he quickly dismissed in favour of ‘governmen-
tality’) in Foucault. An integral part of their modernity critique, their accounts of re-
sistance — or supposed lack thereof — have been criticized for various and at times mu-
tually excluding reasons: they have been criticized not only for providing a too totalizing 
account that denies agency to certain groups but also for denying the pervasiveness of 
power structures and hence overestimating the agency of oppressed groups, and they 
have been blamed for focusing too narrowly on political institutions (Arendt) or on social 
identity (Foucault).2  However, of all political concepts, ‘resistance’ is perhaps among the 
most elusive —if only because, as Howard Caygill comments, it is so deeply rooted in 
political praxis.3 Hence, if the danger of late-modernity lies in isolating and normalizing 
individuals, we might ask how resistance counteracts these dynamics by establishing new 
bonds and seeking out individual singularity.  
For this question, it is especially interesting to offer an Arendtian reading of Foucault: 
although the latter has reflected more extensively and rigorously on the shapes and con-
ditions of resistance, Arendt has put the encounter with the other at the center of political 
praxis and, a fortiori, of acts of resistance. Foucault’s lack of concern with relationality, 
either in his ethics where he accords priority to the relationship to the self over those with 
others, or in his strategic concept of action, has been signalled before.4 While I disagree 
with those criticizing Foucault’s later work for a merely aestheticizing, individualist and 
a-political ethics,5 the neglect of the other is conspicuous in his discussions of solidarity 
and friendship, to which he alludes — just like Arendt — when appraising concrete acts 
of resistance. In this paper, I will thus draw on Arendt’s assessment of concrete human 
 
1 Amy Allen, “Power, Subjectivity, and Agency,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10:2 (2002), 131-
149; Alexander Barder and François Debrix, “Agonal Sovereignty,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 37:7 (2011), 
775-793; Frederick Dolan, “The Paradoxical Liberty of Bio-Power,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 31:3 (2005), 
369-380; Kathrin Braun, “Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault,” Time & Society 16:1 (2007), 5-
23; Dianna Taylor, “Countering Modernity,” Telos 2011:154 (2011), 119-140; Marcelo Hoffman, “Contain-
ments of the Unpredictable in Arendt and Foucault,” Telos 2011:154 (2001), 141-162; Maria Tamboukou, 
“Truth Telling in Foucault and Arendt: Parrhesia, the Pariah and Academics in Dark Times,” Journal of Edu-
cation Policy 27:6 (2012), 849-865. 
2 Critical theorists have been particularly dismissive of the potential of their works to provide a social cri-
tique. See, for instance, Nancy Fraser, “Foucault’s Body-Language,” Salmagundi 61 (1983), 55-70; Seyla Ben-
habib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (2003); For a convincing rebuttal of these interpretations, 
see Christian Volk, “Towards a Critical Theory of the Political,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 42:6 (2016), 549-
575; Amy Allen, The End of Progress (2016), 163-203.. 
3 Howard Caygill, On Resistance (2013). 
4 Allen, “Power, Subjectivity, and Agency”; Johanna Oksala, Foucault on Freedom (2005). 
5 For an early overview of and response to these criticisms, see Jane Bennett, “How Is It, Then, That We Still 
Remain Barbarians?” Political Theory 24:4 (1996), 653-672. 
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relationships to push Foucault away from debates regarding structural constraints and 
the possibility of (subversive) agency and instead formulate a relational account of soli-
darity and friendship. 
This paper pursues an Arendtian reading of Foucault, by which I mean a reading that 
uncovers the disavowal of our relationships to others as well as our thrownness into a 
world furnished by political institutions. Arendt advances this critical reading practice to 
expose the bias inherent in the contemplative life of philosophers against politics as a col-
lective, spontaneous and unpredictable practice. This bias marks traditional political the-
ory and clouds the self-understanding by political agents. In particular, it substitutes an 
autarkic, solitary subject concerned with its own moral and intellectual integrity for an 
agent whose actions depend on the presence of others and are directed toward the condi-
tions under which collective life takes place.6 While Foucault is mindful that practices of 
resistance involve action-in-concert, he does not, due to his overly reflexive and theoreti-
cal notion of freedom, thematize this dimension. Juxtaposing his account of freedom with 
his practical involvement in political struggles, I show how he engages in acts of resistance 
but is unable to thematize these as actions in concert with others because his concept of 
freedom privileges a typically philosophical concern with the self.   
I start (section 1) by reconstructing their converging analysis of the threats to freedom in 
late-modernity. I then continue (section 2) with a discussion of resistance in Arendt, which 
she develops in response to the Shoah to describe actions that both strategically aim to 
eliminate governmental practices of control and performatively enact the freedom endan-
gered by governmental techniques. Furthermore, she provides a concept of solidarity and 
friendship that I draw on to extend Foucault’s analysis of the right claimed by the gov-
erned vis-à-vis their governments (section 3) and of friendship in the context of his inter-
rogation of the LGBT-movement (section 4). 
SETTING UP A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ARENDT AND FOUCAULT 
Despite their intellectual and political differences, Arendt and Foucault converge on their 
analysis of the risks inherent to late-modern society. Even their most historical works are 
motivated by the urgency to identify the biggest danger of the present moment: they un-
derscore the volatile threats that follow from contingent dynamics that govern our socie-
ties.7 Far from being anti-modern reactionaries, Arendt and Foucault warn us of the social 
and governmental practices that use the social and life sciences to exert control over the 
population, which happens first and foremost through the nexus of race and reproduc-
tion.  
 
6 After the Eichmann trial, Arendt qualified her former rejection of the contemplative, among other reasons 
because the thinking-process and its concern for inner harmony (as manifest in Socrates) provides a post-
metaphysical alternative for consciousness. Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations” [1971], 
in Responsibility and Judgment (2003), 159-189. 
7 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” [1983], in Ethics: Subjec-
tivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (1997), 256. 
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The loci classici for the intersection of Foucault and Arendt are their analyses of Nazism 
in the conclusion of The Will to Knowledge and the final lecture of Society Must Be Defended 
(1976) on the one hand, and The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966 [1951]) on the other.8 In a 
striking resemblance, both authors remind us that the genocides of the twentieth century 
should not be understood as the classical right over life and death exerted by the sovereign 
but as the consequence of a state that aims to maintain and foster the life processes of the 
social body — a development in which some are bound to ‘atrophy’.9 Nazism in particular 
yields “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.”10 It aims “not only to 
liberate the historical and natural forces, but to accelerate them to a speed they never 
would reach if left to themselves” by “execut[ing] on the spot the death sentences which 
Nature is supposed to have pronounced on races or individuals who are ‘unfit to live.’”11 
The verdict supposedly follows from the demands of survival and optimalization of the 
population. It thus breaks with the older model of sovereign power that grounded it in 
the sovereign’s right to punish those who stood up against him.12 In that old model, the 
crime of the transgressor was mirrored by the punishment by the sovereign. In the new 
model, however, both the executed and executioner are “subjectively innocent”13 for they 
intend neither to commit a crime nor to punish one.  
Biological racism is crucial in drawing a distinction between those whose life is condu-
cive to that of the population — and can stay alive — and those whose life is not — and 
must hence wither away. To control the life of the human species with the objective of its 
reinvigoration requires a break “within the biological continuum of the human race of 
races.”14 The very novelty of genocide does not consist in the scale or the number of vic-
tims but in its evolutionist justification. The paradox that people are left to die in the name 
of life can only be understood by a distinction within the human race. While race is the 
primal fracture within the human species, Arendt reminds us that it can and has been 
predicated on other naturalized differences too, such as health and age.15  Importantly, 
their argument against biological racism does not proceed by showing how it is false or 
bad science but how it functions in the operations of a state trying to fully control its pop-
ulation. They refrain from an idealist position in which the idea of racial superiority cul-
minated in the Shoah and the other atrocities committed by the Nazis; instead, they stress 
 
8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998); Dolan, “The Paradoxical Liberty of Bio-
Power”; Braun, “Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault”; Hoffman, “Containments of the Un-
predictable in Arendt and Foucault”; Barder and Debrix, “Agonal Sovereignty”; Taylor, “Countering Mo-
dernity”; Kim Su Rasmussen, “Foucault’s Genealogy of Racism,” Theory, Culture & Society 25:8 (2011), 34-51; 
Jacob Maze, “Towards an Analytic of Violence,” Foucault Studies 25 (2018), 120-145. 
9 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge [1978] (1998), 136, 137. 
10 Ibid., 138. 
11 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966), 466. 
12 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 136–37; Michel Foucault, ’Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège 
de France 1975-76 (2018), 241. 
13 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 466. 
14 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 255. 
15 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 433; Agamben is mindful of this in his reading, arguably at the expense 
of the nexus of race and sex. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 150. 
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how it dovetailed with the attempt for full domination. This also means that resistance 
against it does not consist in refuting biological racism but in obstructing the racist man-
agement of society.  
It is fair to say that Arendt meticulously details the totalitarian reorganization of society 
while Foucault focuses on the scientific and policing practices that provide the wider con-
text in which Nazism could emerge. His genealogy sketches the circumstantial power re-
lations that upheld and enabled the emergence of Nazism, while she aims in the third and 
final volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism to lay bare its inner structure.16 From her 
analysis, we learn how the control of the population was largely carried out by the police, 
whose systematic use of arbitrary arrests was instrumental in terrorizing the population. 
Their grip was nearly inescapable due to, firstly, the collaboration with police forces in 
other countries and, secondly, the ubiquitous distrust as everyone feared their betrayal by 
another.17 On a personal level, this pervasive policing induces a sense of suffocating prox-
imity to others: “by pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space be-
tween them”,18 a condition Arendt likens to “a band of iron.”19 As a consequence, sponta-
neous action together with others was nearly impossible, and this predicament applies a 
fortiori to the concentration camps, which Arendt denounces as experiments in total dom-
ination. Completely cut off from those outside the camps, those imprisoned were subject 
to the perfected skills of the Nazis to pitch their victims against one another and to numb 
them through the use of torture.  
Foucault refrains from a detailed analysis of Nazism, highlighting instead its historical 
emergence at the intersection of two technologies of control. The first concerns discipli-
nary techniques that are directed at the body and that take place in clearly demarcated 
institutions such as the prison.20 The second concerns the totalizing techniques that are 
directed at the population as a whole and which gave rise to statistics and other social 
sciences. Importantly, the two intersect on the issue of procreative sex: it is situated at the 
overlap of the optimalization of docile bodies with the general concern with birth rates 
and population control.21 The point is not to simply stimulate population growth but to 
guarantee the population has the size corresponding to its territory and, one might add, 
its demographic (and racial) composition.22 In other words, Foucault’s approach has the 
benefit of showing how Nazi Germany executed an extensive natalist policy that restricts 
birth among some and stimulates it among other groups. Beyond Nazism, he is concerned 
with sexuality as an object of study and intervention: not just procreative sex but also —
 
16 Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin,” [1953], in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and To-
talitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (1994), 403; See also Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1977-1978 (2007), 276ff. 
17 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 419ff. 
18 Ibid., 466. 
19 Ibid., 465. 
20 Will to Knowledge, 1:139ff; Society Must Be Defended, 242; See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The 
Birth of the Prison [1975] (1991). 
21 Will to Knowledge, 140, 144; Penelope Deutscher, Foucault’s Futures: A Critique of Reproductive Reason (2018), 
76ff. 
22 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 323ff. 
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and arguably more importantly to him — the “lines of attack” that proceed through psy-
chiatrization and produce the figures of the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, 
and the sexual pervert.23  
Coming from a completely different angle, Arendt also remarks on the totalitarian con-
cern with birth, but her approach overlooks what Foucault calls “the socialization of pro-
creative behavior.”24 In her existentialist approach, natality indicates the capacity to begin 
anew, and this human spontaneity poses a hindrance to the social processes that totalitar-
ian governments try to foster.25 When she thus describes totalitarianism as the attempt to 
eliminate spontaneity and contain the novelty contained in birth, she accuses it of sup-
pressing the very capacity that defines humans as political creatures. These observations 
are further developed in The Human Condition, describing birth as an unambiguously pos-
itive event that, in its promise of unpredictable and spontaneous action, eludes the pre-
dictability of statistical probability.26 Even if we might suspect the formative influence of 
Martin Heidegger behind her admittedly crude rejection of the social sciences, the juxta-
position with natality points towards the latter as a condition for action.27 While the reha-
bilitation of political praxis is the main stake in her criticism of the social sciences, for 
Foucault the detrimental effect of scientific normalization is particularly manifest in the 
management of sexuality. 
Crucially, Arendt and Foucault both engage in a historical project of deconstructing 
philosophical concepts to open up a space of reflecting and contesting the historically con-
tingent conditions of the present. Written in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War, The Origins of Totalitarianism is marked by the shock at the Shoah and the desire to 
articulate a new political-theoretical vocabulary to grasp totalitarianism. Foucault, writing 
twenty-five years later, responds to the sexual liberation movement that fails to escape 
from the normalizing force of mainstream sexologist discourse — the same force that at 
some prior point had coalesced into Nazism. As we will see, this difference in focus also 
implies that Arendt situates resistance in the context of state-run persecution while Fou-
cault focuses on the nods and operations of sexuality. 
Both signal the devastating effect of late-modern processes on the relational fabric. This 
is particularly clear in Arendt’s description of Nazism as “organized loneliness”28 that 
breaks up even the most personal bonds of affection. More generally, loneliness prevails 
in mass society due to the erasure of the spaces for meaningful relationships.29 This applies 
not only to the public sphere, where people convene for political action, but also `to the 
private realm and the bonds with family and friends.’30 That diagnosis fits in with her 
 
23 Will to Knowledge, 153. 
24 Ibid., 154. 
25 Origins of Totalitarianism, 465. 
26 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958] (1998), 178; Ibid., 42ff. 
27 Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991), 21–23; Arendt, “Philosophy and Sociol-
ogy” [1930], in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn 
(1994), 28-43. 
28 Origins of Totalitarianism, 478. 
29 Human Condition, 59. 
30 Ibid.. 
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denouncement of what she calls ‘the rise of the social.’31 While this is not the place to 
discuss at length this hotly contested notion, it suffices to state here that it refers to the 
elevation of biological needs to the prime political concern in both theory (i.e., Marxism) 
and institutions (liberal democracy). It also involves a collective self-understanding as 
‘animal laborans’, that is, a biological creature whose behaviour is dictated by their needs 
and oriented towards survival. Importantly, this mode of existence precludes an engage-
ment with others except as a means to meet one’s needs: it undermines the capacity to 
relate to others as political agents and also as a friend or lover. In both sets of relationships, 
the other displays a unicity that exceeds their utility. In this sense, the rise of the social 
also entails an impoverishment of social relationships as we relate to others merely in 
terms of usefulness.  
Similarly, Foucault decries the uniformity of our modes of relating to others, albeit in 
a more circumferential way. It can be discerned in his description of the individualization 
of biopolitics, which includes the disciplinary techniques or “dividing practices”32 that 
physically separates those subjected to these techniques, such as inmates and factory 
workers, and thus undermines any relationships between them. In his later work, indi-
vidualization is linked to pastoral power, of which the paradigmatic relationship is that 
of confession. Even if confession, strictly speaking, is situated in a collective such as a 
monastic order or the parish, Foucault stresses that it establishes a binary relationship of 
obedience between pastor and confessant that forecloses other, more communal modes of 
existence.33 In very general terms, individualization implies a range of techniques that 
hamper relationships with those placed in a similar position vis-à-vis those techniques.34 
This point is driven home when he comments  
We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably impoverished. Society 
and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility of relationships because 
a rich relational world would be very complex to manage. We should fight against the 
impoverishment of the relational fabric.35 
Late-modern governmentality sanctions a very small range of relationship due to the dif-
ficulty of controlling relational complexity. In a 1981 interview with a gay magazine, he 
suggests that the impoverishment impacts members of the gay community particularly 
hard, and the struggle against it can and should be part of the gay movement.36 In a similar 
vein, he approvingly comments in 1982 on contemporary social struggles (such as the gay 
movement and the women’s liberation movement) as attacks on “everything that 
 
31 Ibid., chaps. 6, 43–45. 
32 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” [1982], in Power (2000), 326. 
33 Security, Territory, Population, 210. 
34 I am glossing over the extensive debate on the transition by the later Foucault from biopolitics to govern-
mentality, assuming that the latter widens the historical scope of the former and pays greater attention to the 
non-violent modes in which a population is controlled and its subjects atomized. Consequently, ‘govern-
mentality’ grants more consideration as to how subjects conduct themselves in a given institutional setup.  
35 Michel Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will” [1982], in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (1997), 
158. 
36 Ibid., 159. 
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separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the 
individual back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way.”37 
While the secondary literature has focused extensively on the critique of identity, the com-
ment on community has been largely ignored. Indeed, Foucault himself seems to have 
intimated but not thematized the establishment of new modes of coexistence. Why? 
One answer can be found in his conception of freedom that he develops towards the 
end of his life and which attributes little importance to relationality. The similarities and 
differences with Arendt are instructive. They both develop a concept of freedom that 
starts from the unpredictable interaction with others, out of which a new field of possible 
actions emerge. Freedom consists in the bringing about of different conditions under 
which one lives, in a way that could not have been anticipated or even imagined before-
hand, rather than a choice between given options. In these freedom practices, subjects also 
have a chance to develop their individuality, as their unique way of being in the world. 
Arendt articulates this individuality as the self-disclosure of one’s unicity to others, real-
izing a potential for uniqueness that is indicated in the fact of natality, namely, that each 
one of us is born in a distinct body and capable of new, unpredictable actions. This self-
disclosure requires the presence of others who ask, in a welcoming and curious gesture, 
“‘who are you?’.”38 Importantly, freedom refers to a political experience of collectively 
determining the conditions of one’s co-existence, of which revolutions are the typically 
modern manifestations.39 While Arendt’s oeuvre can convincingly be read as a long med-
itation on the modern conditions for freedom and its institutionalization, the concept is 
limited to Foucault’s later work on ethics as a practice of self-constitution. Tellingly, and 
in clear contrast to Arendt, freedom primarily designates a relationship to the self. Free-
dom consists, negatively understood, in a reflection on the contingent, historical condi-
tions of our subjectivity, which liberates us from the identities and habits that have been 
imposed on us.40 This typically modern, critical attitude allows us to rethink who we are.41 
Importantly, the critical attitude has a reflexive dimension, which also pertains to the 
Greco-Roman care for the self. 42 This care, which is oriented towards moral perfection 
and which Foucault understands (following Pierre Hadot) as philosophy as a way of life, 
can, but does not have to, involve interaction with others; if it does, it is mostly strategic 
insofar as the other appears either as a guide or as someone to be guided. From an Ar-
endtian point of view, he fails to account for the alterity of the other as well as the priority 
of the relationships with others over that with oneself.43 Philosophy, even if understood 
 
37 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 330. 
38 Human Condition, 178. 
39 Hannah Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution,” The Journal of Politics 
20:1 (1958), 5–43; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution [1963] (1984). 
40 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure [1984] (1992), 8. 
41 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” [1984], in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (1997), 303–19; Foucault, 
Use of Pleasure, 8–9. 
42 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom” [1984], in Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth (1997), 284. 
43 For a convincing critique, Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 204ff; Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 
(2005), 23. 
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as a spiritual practice rather than a mode of contemplation, might still display the neglect 
of plurality that Arendt accused it of.44  
ARENDT’S PRINCIPLE OF RESISTANCE  
Arendt’s recuperation of praxis revolves on the relational dimension of human existence. 
Not surprisingly, this dimension takes on a normative role in her description of acts of 
resistance. While her discussion of resistance is fragmented in comparison to Foucault 
and restricted to the Second World War, it consistently shows how acts of resistance es-
tablish bonds that actively counteract the divisional practices of late-modern regimes. 
As we have seen, Arendt’s attack on Nazism does not envisage biological racism, be-
cause it does not require its accessories to believe in the racist ideology in order to func-
tion. The totalitarian society is organized along the racist categories of Nazi ideology in 
such an all-pervading manner that, regardless if one subscribes to the pseudo-scientific 
laws of racial degeneration, one’s collaboration in reproducing the gap separating the 
non-Jewish from the Jewish population only requires participation in mundane social ac-
tivities. In this sense, the state practices of persecution take priority over their theoretical 
‘justifications’.  
The reversal of state practice and rationale implies that the activities of the state pro-
duce the very subjects that they posit in their ideology: treating some groups inhumanely, 
these groups are made into subhumans. Objections to the mistreatment should, as a con-
sequence, not be restricted to a logical refutation of Nazi ideology by stating, for instance, 
that we are all humans, but in activities that actively counteract the production of op-
pressed groups.  
One might object that these acts of resistance only refer liberation, which she, like Fou-
cault, distinguishes from freedom: whereas the former consists in ending domination 
which may or may not involve the use of violence, the latter consists in a non-violent 
practice.45 Given Arendt’s strict division between poiesis and praxis, and violence and 
power (where the first term in both pairs corresponds to liberation), resistance would not 
illustrate the collective dimension of freedom which I hope to expound on here. Yet, I 
believe that Arendt would agree with Foucault when he positively answers the question 
of whether, in some situations, liberation can be “a mode or form of practice of the free-
dom”.46 Moreover, the suggestion that resistance merely resides in violent, goal-oriented 
activities presupposes that it is up against a force of domination which is primarily violent 
itself: while Nazism is undeniably a violent regime, its operation is irreducible to violence 
 
44 Pierre Hadot, “Spiritual Exercises” [1987] and “Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Cultivation of the Self’” 
[1987], both in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (1995). The discovery of 
“the mystery and splendor of existence” (p. 212), which Arendt ascribes as the wonder at the origin of phi-
losophy, is exactly what she considers no longer possible for it is displaced by the horror over human co-
existence; Hannah Arendt, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought” [1954], in Es-
says in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (1994), 445. 
45 Arendt, On Revolution, 29; Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 282. 
46 Ibid., 284. 
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insofar as it relied on the support of the wider population. Refuting the common impres-
sion that power (the collective determination of the conditions under which we life) is 
normatively positive for Arendt,47 Christian Volk rightly argues that “[w]herever power 
materialises in a way that burdens political action and therefore perpetuates political 
domination and oppression [such as totalitarianism], this power is always productive as 
well” in that “it generates political resistance.”48  
This coincidence of liberation and freedom is particularly clear in the defiance of one 
key strategy by the Nazis that Arendt describes at length: the deprivation of citizenship. 
Stateless refugees had to seek shelter elsewhere, only to realize that national membership 
is crucial to be able to settle down in an era when the whole surface of the earth is covered 
by nation-states. This step was preparatory in the sense that the dispersal of the stateless 
across European borders was followed by the Nazi’s claiming back the stateless from the 
occupied countries to send them to concentration camps. The famous ‘paradox of the 
Rights of Man’ points us to the inability for philosophical concepts to grasp the political 
significance of the production of large groups of stateless people. This critique, which ex-
poses the tense mutual implication of national sovereignty and universal rights, also in-
forms Arendt’s principle of resistance against the Nazi regime: “If one is attacked as a Jew, 
one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a world-citizen, not as an up-
holder of the Rights of Man.”49 Instead of invoking an abstract, innate right to be included 
(or one’s cultural and national belonging to the very social body from which one is ex-
pelled), the exclusion has to be fought in terms of the identity on the basis of which one is 
excluded. In other words, one has to fight the governmental control of the population, 
and this struggle should not be waged in the name of idealized universals but of the par-
ticular identities that are the product of the political reality one wants to change. 50 
What matters for the present discussion is not that the struggle against subjection re-
claims the terms of that subjection, but that it relies on a joint effort. This is particularly 
clear in her discussion of the Danish defiance of the Nazis: they refused the deportation 
of the stateless refugees on their territory. As they no longer have citizenship rights, the 
Danish argument ran, Germany also cannot reclaim them. This is a story, she suggests, 
that should be “required reading in political science for all students who wish to learn 
something about the enormous power potential in non-violent action and in resistance to 
an opponent possessing vastly superior means of violence.”51 In spite of the German at-
tempts to tear up the relational fabric of the societies subjugated to their rule, the Danish 
act in concert. Even more so, because they collectively uphold the rights of refugees, they 
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also retain the legal framework that was built up over centuries to make the modern world 
hospitable to human uniqueness, and that the Nazis were intent on destroying.  
For Arendt, these concerns spring forth from a fundamental political-existential task, 
namely our collective responsibility: How are we responsible for the common world that 
conditions the existence of each of us? This responsibility requires some degree of power, 
for “responsibility for the world, which is primarily political, (…) always presupposes at 
least a minimum of political power.”52 Furthermore, it is mediated in the sense that it is 
not limited to the ethical encounter with the other but involves the historically contingent 
situation that can be changed by a common effort. In this act of solidarity, to put the issue 
more precisely, the bond between people arises from their common investment (which 
she calls ‘interest’) in changing the world: “it is out of solidarity that they establish delib-
erately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and 
exploited.” People unite for different reasons behind a shared project. But even if some 
are motivated by self-serving considerations, the concerted action that follows from these 
diverse motivations and the effect of these actions benefits all those with whom they share 
the world.  
Moreover, solidarity as a shared responsibility towards the world transcends the nar-
row limits of the nation-state due to the historical-geographical condition we find our-
selves in. Humanity, Arendt argues in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), became a con-
crete experience not because it formed a regulative ideal, but under colonial imperialism. 
“The trouble is that our period has so strangely intertwined the good with the bad,” she 
writes, “that without the imperialists’ ‘expansion for expansion’s sake,’ the world might 
never have become one.”53 Belying the lofty sentiments expressed in Enlightenment ideals 
of the united family of mankind, the idea of a human race has historically coincided with 
imperial subjugation of colonized peoples. While we have to acknowledge Arendt’s anti-
primitivist comments with regard to sub-Sahara Africa,54 we can read her as arguing that 
positing a universal mankind radically excludes those who have their humanity denied; 
when mankind is conceived biologically as the human race, this exclusion takes the form 
of racialized dehumanization. Humanity in this sense of the word (we will turn to another 
meaning in a bit) is the result of and so-called justification for contingent historical pro-
cesses that drove global imperialism. Furthermore, the spread of techniques of total dom-
ination does not depend on the totalitarian aspiration to infinitely extend one’s territory 
but can also follow from their use by non-totalitarian states. The realization of the horrors 
to which man is capable, Arendt writes as early as 1945, are experienced on a personal 
level as an “elemental shame [of being human]”, and politically as a “sense of 
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international solidarity.”55 If we are to resist the attempts at domination, we have to take 
stock of their global nature: if not as a consequence of totalitarian occupation, then by the 
adaptation of these techniques by other countries. Resistance, in other words, is an action 
in solidarity that at once enacts and aims for a desired state of co-existence, and that 
acknowledges the shared, global predicament of being subjected to governmental tech-
niques of domination. 
Developing an alternative conception of humanity that counteracts the effects of global 
imperialism and totalitarian governmental techniques, Arendt turns to antiquity, and pro-
vides an account of friendship that presents a model of both political action and resistance. 
In this alternative conception, someone’s humanity is not a universal brotherhood based 
on an innate capacity, either reason or empathy: instead, it is the frail, hard-won effect of 
engaging in concrete relationships with others. Friendship, rather than fraternity, exem-
plifies humanity, and basing herself on Aristotle she asserts that philia is not a private 
relationship in which one shares confidences but a public one that establishes equality 
between the friends. It does so through an ongoing dialogue between the friends of a 
world shared in common: given her phenomenology of plurality, it is only insofar as we 
can communicate our experiences with others that the objects of these experiences become 
real and meaningful.56 To return to her analysis of totalitarian oppression: Nazism under-
mines personal relationships and organizes society in such a way that, regardless of indi-
viduals’ stance on its racist propaganda, non-Jewish people dissociate from Jewish people 
out of prudential reasons. Hence, the rare cases in which friendship (or love, for that mat-
ter57) between a Jewish and a non-Jewish person persists, it is forced into seclusion, and 
there develops a subversive, albeit limited, potential:  
in the case of friendship between a German and a Jew under the conditions of the Third 
Reich it would scarcely have been a sign of humanness for the friends to have said: Are 
we not both human beings? It would have been mere evasion of reality and of the world 
common to both at that time; they would not have been resisting the world as it was. A 
law that prohibited the intercourse of Jews and Germans could be evaded but not defied 
by people who denied the reality of the distinction. In keeping with a humanness that 
had not lost the solid ground of the reality of persecution, they would have had to say 
to each other: A German and a Jew, and friends.58  
The friends act out of loyalty towards one another and out of truthfulness towards the 
world in which they live and which treats them differently; and although they do not 
necessarily intend to defy the Nazi regime, their friendship enacts in the intimacy of the 
private sphere the equality that is denied to them in the public world. This conception of 
the private sphere is a romanticized one: it provides a frail bulwark against the 
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normalizing and dividing practices of fascist society. This is “[where] we choose those 
with whom we wish to spend our lives, personal friends and those we love,” and because 
this “choice is guided not by likeness or qualities shared by a group of people (…) but 
strikes, inexplicably and unerringly, at one person in his uniqueness, his unlikeliness to 
all other people we know,” it defies the social dynamics of discrimination.59Arendt, whose 
marriage to a non-Jewish man in 1939 was illegal under the Nuremberg Laws then in 
force, would be careful in  welcoming these personal relations as deliberate acts of re-
sistance. Furthermore, her main concern is with the institutionalization of different modes 
of human existence: in the case of friendship and love, this refers to the constitutional 
protection of the private sphere. In contradistinction from Foucault, who stresses the re-
strictive dimension of civil law,60 Arendt emphasizes its enabling dimension. The right to 
a private sphere safeguards our bonds with friends and loved ones: the near-total domi-
nation by totalitarianism violated this basic right, and in her otherwise problematic com-
ments on Jim Crow laws, she fiercely objects to the criminalization of interracial marriage 
in the southern US for its denial of a private sphere.61   
To summarize, Arendt provides us with two forms of resistance that give central stage 
to the (possibility for the) encounter with the other— the encounter, that is, with the 
unique yet equal other who exceeds the identity that is imposed on them. Even if it is true 
that Arendt’s principle of resistance stresses the affirmation of a subjugated identity, it 
does so in a way that does not reify that identity. Instead, as Lisa Disch observes, this 
principle can be very useful to political struggles, as it shows “how to acknowledge an 
identity as a ‘political fact’ and, at the same time, to refute it.”  In this sense, stating one’s 
identity in the terms used by the oppressor can be read as a preliminary to restructuring 
the field of possible actions: resistance always takes place within and against the rules as 
laid down by one’s antagonist.  The centrality of the other in renegotiating, defying, and 
subverting these rules can be usefully implemented in Foucault’s concept of resistance to 
which I turn next. 
FOUCAULT ON SOLIDARITY 
‘Biopolitics’ was discarded by Foucault shortly after coining it.62 If we are to find a concept 
of resistance, we have to look for it in the projects that spurred his initial interest in bio-
politics and that he develops afterwards, namely the genealogical studies of governmen-
tality and of the subject of desire. Whereas the first is the object of his courses of 1977-1978 
and 1978-1979 on political reason, the second is published as the second, third and fourth 
volumes of The History of Sexuality. They are also closely tied to the political struggles 
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Foucault engages in,63 and the question thus arises if and how his ‘conceptual toolkit’ en-
ables him to reflect on these struggles and more specifically on their collective, world-
oriented dimension.   
Before we look at governmentality (this section) and the history of sexuality (next sec-
tion), two points are important. Firstly, and in clear distinction from Arendt, he systema-
tizes the link between resistance, power and contemporary struggles, such as these were 
waged by the anti-psychiatry movement, feminist groups, and the gay movement. Ap-
provingly citing these struggles, he argues that their main objective “is to attack not so 
much such-or-such institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, 
a form of power.”64 They challenge, in other words, the governmental techniques and di-
viding practices that individualize the subject. Just as governmental techniques try to steer 
the conduct of individuals by isolating the individual and tying her to herself, contempo-
rary struggles are predominantly directed “against that which ties the individual to him-
self and submits him to others in this way.”65 These fights share some characteristics, like 
their transversal, international character; their assertion of the right to be different as well 
as to form alternative communities; and the concern with the question of who we are, as 
well as the refusal of an answer that ignores individuality or that relies on “scientific or 
administrative inquisition.”66 Analytically, they differ from other struggles such as those 
against exploitation, while historically they are the main (but not exclusive) conflict of our 
time. Furthermore, Foucault understands resistance as a minimum requirement for power 
relations. Power relations do not indicate a limit to free action but the attempt to structure 
the field of possible behaviour; “resistance is a part of this strategic relationship of which 
power consists. Resistance really always relies upon the situation against which it strug-
gles.”67 The mutual implication of resistance and power distinguishes these relationships 
from those of coercion, in which the control of one agent by another is so absolute (for 
instance through the use of violence) that no possibility is left to negotiate or subvert that 
control. These programmatic comments on resistance underscore the political stakes in 
Foucault’s later work, and it also refers to a form of power that is crucial to his study of 
governmentality and of the subject of desire: pastoral power.68 
This brings me to my second point, the contestation of pastoral power. This form of 
power revolves on issues of wellbeing, which is initially understood as the salvation of 
the soul, on the basis of which the pastor claims complete obedience by the members of 
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his flock.69 The assertion of this power in the late middle-ages, by making confession ob-
ligatory for the laity, elicits a strong response. Spiritual movements such as the Flemish 
mystics engage in what Foucault calls ‘contre-conduite’: refusing to have their conduct 
governed, they engage in practices of self-transformation that enable them to receive re-
vealed truth, which short-circuits the pastor and his claim to a privileged, mediating role 
in the process of salvation.70 This form of resistance deploys a counter-discourse but also 
alternative ethical practices (to use the term in a sense that Foucault develops later): the 
mystics develop an alternative lifestyle that subverts, exploits, and defies the rules for 
conduct imposed by the Church. Their struggle is an attempt to be governed differently.71 
This form of resistance contests the way in which one is conducted by others, and also 
demarcates “an area in which each individual can conduct himself, the domain of one’s 
own conduct or behavior.”72 This latter dimension – the government of the self by the self 
– is subsequently developed in Foucault’s writings on ethics, both regarding ancient prac-
tices of care of the self and the critical attitude that he discerns in Kant.  
Although Foucault’s later work scarcely deploys the notion of counter-conduct, he in-
vites us to look for instances directed against political institutions:  
I think that inasmuch as many pastoral functions were taken up in the exercise of gov-
ernmentality, and inasmuch as government also begins to want to take responsibility 
for people’s conduct (…), then we see revolts of conduct arising less from the religious 
institution and much more from political institutions.73  
To take up this invitation, we need to grasp more precisely how Foucault understands 
political institutions. When he embarks on the ‘history of governmentality’, he under-
stands the latter as “the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has 
the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and appa-
ratuses of security as its essential technique.”74 Very generally, he argues that the art of 
government was central to the seventeenth century literature on the raison d’état (in which 
the strength of the state relied on the population), while the question of how to conduct 
the population was problematized from the eighteenth century onwards in liberal theory. 
Jumping to the end of his lecture series Security, Territory, Population, we read that, in the 
nineteenth century, good government was taken to find its limit and its justification in 
enabling the undisrupted economic processes of exchange and trade, using the police as 
the security apparatus while managing the population.75 The theoretical doctrine that 
emerges out of this governmental practice is of course liberalism, and its British, utilitarian 
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strand is central to the first lectures of Foucault’s next course, The Birth of Biopolitics. “Util-
itarianism,” he argues, “is a technology of government,” and insofar it contains references 
to rights and laws, these juridical elements should not lead us to mistake it for a  form of 
juridical power aiming to delimit sovereign force but rather as the result of a critical in-
terrogation of the utility of governmental practices.76 Writing during the raising promi-
nence of human rights advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, Foucault suggests that the invocation of human rights at times raises the 
juridical claim of the rights of man — originating in the revolutionary proclamation of the 
man and the citizen in public law — but at other times the “claim of the independence of 
the governed vis-à-vis governmentality.”77  
If we should look for a form of counter-conduct to neoliberal governmentality, we 
might thus look at the claims that utilize, re-orient, and subvert the vocabulary of govern-
mentality that the governed struggle against, as well as the assemblage of organizations 
that oppose and operate in reaction to the apparatuses of the late-modern state. ‘The right 
of the governed,’ implied in the above quotation and first used in Foucault’s intervention 
on behalf of Klaus Croissant (1977), offers one such creative subversion. This right is not 
grounded on an innate human capacity but is “plus précis, plus historiquement déterminé 
que les droits de l'homme” insofar as it is grounded in the opposition to a state that dan-
gerously tends to tighten its management of our daily lives.78 The ‘right of the governed’ 
sporadically recurs throughout the last seven years of his life, especially in response to 
contemporary events such as the repression of the Polish Solidarity movement and the 
violence levelled by the newly established, theocratic regime of Iran. 79 More specifically, 
his engagement in a ‘counter-conduct of rights’ (to use the felicitous phrase by Ben 
Golder80) consists in a tactical invocation of rights-discourse to claim the freedom to be 
governed differently. Furthermore, this form of resistance has a collective dimension that 
is hinted at by a short statement that Foucault delivered in 1984, ‘Face aux gouvernements, 
les droits de l'homme’ (1984). In this short statement that was drafted only shortly before 
delivering it on the occasion of a committee against piracy,81 he invokes a specific right on 
the contingent condition of our shared exposure to governing techniques and appeals to 
an alternative collective that opposes these techniques:  
There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties, and that obliges 
one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims. 
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After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to 
show mutual solidarity.82 
Notice how Foucault refrains from a universal concept of mankind and instead invokes a 
‘we’ that emerges from a shared contemporary condition. It is through the governing tech-
niques that one is constituted as a subject in the first place; and it is this always-already 
fabricated subject that claims a right vis-à-vis the state apparatuses that form her. In a 
move that is at once reflexive and tactical, Foucault uses the very terminology with which 
he describes utilitarian thought to critically interrogate governmental techniques on a 
non-utilitarian ground. Moreover, even though these techniques play out differently for 
various groups in society, they form a danger to all individuals, and this shared risk forms 
the historically contingent ground for acts of solidarity.  
Foucault’s call for solidarity among the governed is interesting because it posits a po-
litical, collective agent that emerges out of a shared condition. His invocation of a ‘we’ 
puts into perspective Amy Allen’s claim that Foucault is unable to develop an account of 
political alliances due to his strategic concept of action, which leads her to conclude that 
Foucauldian politics should be supplemented with an Arendtian, associative praxis. 83 As 
we saw above, Arendt defines solidarity as action in concert, where participants convene 
to change the ‘world’, that is, the social and political conditions under which they live. 
While they might do so for a variety of reasons, they share, in Arendt’s reading, a presence 
of mind regarding the historical moment that they find themselves in. When Foucault 
invokes the solidarity among the governed, he has in mind something similar to Arendt’s 
acknowledgement of the present; yet, while he might perform and participate in acts of 
solidarity, he fails to thematize them.  
It is worth reminding that the collective agent – the ‘we’ invoked in his op-ed – does 
not originate in a pre-existing social critique (e.g., Marxism) but in a genealogical interro-
gation of the present. Relating methodological to political concerns, he states in a 1984 
interview:    
the problem is (…) to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a ‘we’ in 
order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, 
rather, necessary to make the future formation of a ‘we’ possible by elaborating the ques-
tion. Because it seems to me that the ‘we’ must not be previous to the question; it can 
only be the result – and the necessarily temporary result – of the question as it is posed 
in the new terms in which one formulates it.84 
The ‘we’ that Foucault alludes to emerges out of a process of interrogating the present by 
highlighting how it could have been different – and how we, as subjects shaped in this 
present, could have been different too. The historical study of problematizations thus 
opens up a space for “work on our limits” and requires a critical attitude that Foucault, in 
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his reading of Kant’s What is Enlightenment?, considers the modern practice of freedom.85 
Yet, there are some problems with this constitution of the ‘we’. Firstly, compared to Ar-
endt, Foucault’s invocation of solidarity might be overly self-centred: it consists primarily 
in the appeal to engage in a similar ethical subjectification of a critical attitude (which is, 
of course, not the same as demanding that everyone forms themselves into a similar ethi-
cal subject) and only secondarily in a call for identifying with others. This sense of soli-
darity is restrictive in the sense that it is based in acts of self-transformation: the ‘we’ fol-
lows from the work on one’s limits. Indeed, Foucault at times prioritizes this transforma-
tive, reflexive labour over participation in action. With Arendt, we could argue that soli-
darity should not be primarily defined by the subjects who join a struggle but by the col-
lective action that constitutes the struggle. To think, as Arendt does, of acts of solidarity as 
those that bridge differences in interest and pay no heed to the character of its participants 
is not only more intuitive and less restrictive than Foucault’s suggestion: it also prioritizes 
the relationships with others – namely those with whom we act in concert — over those 
to ourselves. In Arendt’s view, when we act in solidary with others, we transcend the 
limitations that have been imposed on us on the basis of ‘what’ we are and that are used 
to govern, or even forcibly control, our conduct. The space of appearance that emerges 
out of collective acts such as struggles of solidarity forms a site of self-disclosure where 
we can become a unique person who is different from what society destined each of us to 
be because of our race, class or gender. In other words, while Foucault suggests (without 
ever stating it explicitly) that the work on ourselves precedes a collective awareness that 
can spur us into action, Arendt would stress that our participation in collective action 
enables us to interrogate and reconfigure the limits of ourselves.  
The political implications of their respective notions of solidarity are particularly rele-
vant for the ‘right of the governed’. For Arendt, collective struggles are directed at chang-
ing the objective, institutional conditions under which people enter into and maintain re-
lationships. As such, they are distinct from moral considerations that “hinge on interest 
in the self.”86 Reflecting primarily on moral conscience, she contends that it is a side-prod-
uct of the thinking-process. This “soundless dialogue between me and myself” requires 
that I am friends with myself and hence that I refrain from doing anything which might 
keep me from liking myself. Thinking has a negative role: it interrupts our activity, which 
is clear in philosophy and ethics (in the Arendtian sense of the voice of conscience), and 
it resembles the effect that Foucault ascribes to his genealogical studies.87  To use Arendt’s 
vocabulary, his study of ethical-critical practices remains within the limits of the late-mod-
ern tradition that centers on questions of self-alienation (which he, in contradistinction 
from Marx, celebrates through his appraisal of ‘limit-experiences’), and he foregoes the 
pressing problem of world-alienation, a term that Arendt critically uses for the lack of 
attention for enduring, stable institutions that facilitate human initiative and plurality. 
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Solidarity, in other words, should not just be understood as an act of interrogating and 
redesigning who we are at this very moment but primarily as a shared attempt to change 
the institutions that we will bequeath to the next generations: not, in other words, an in-
ward directed care for the self but an outward oriented care for the world. 
FOUCAULT ON FRIENDSHIP  
The above discussion shows how Foucault’s later writings on ethics and politics “high-
light the strategic role played by the relationship of oneself to oneself within the frame-
work of the government of human beings as well as, a fortiori, in the possibility to resist 
it.”88 The emphasis on practices of self-transformation also delimits another site of re-
sistance: friendship.89 Very generally, Foucault studies male bonds in antiquity as part of 
his genealogy of the subject of desire — a project that includes but is not restricted to 
sexuality. In a more explicitly contemporaneous and political approach, he also discusses 
the theme towards the end of his life in a number of interviews with gay magazines.90 
Without suggesting a transhistorical equivalence of these male bonds, Foucault under-
scores in each of these cases the ethical work on oneself. The Arendtian challenge to his 
account concerns the status of the friend, and more specifically the encounter with the 
other in their unfathomable difference.  
How does his discussion of friendship relate to his critique of pastoral power? The lat-
ter operates through the injunction to speak the truth of one’s desire. Like Arendt, who 
articulates a similar point to criticize the accusations of hypocrisy in politics,91 Foucault is 
critical of the normalizing effect of confessional practices: desires and intentions do not 
consist in a subjectivity that precede their articulation but are constituted in confessions 
and subsequently used to categorize and exclude individuals. A problem with the gay 
movement is that it reproduces this form of power when it strives for sexual liberation. 
Liberation wrongly suggests that once we defy sexual prohibitions, we are free to be who 
we are, that is, follow freely our desires that had hitherto been repressed. Arguing against 
this idea, Foucault first argues in The Will to Knowledge that it is not just theoretically 
flawed in its assessment of power relations but also historically-politically problematic: it 
suggests a rupture between a Victorian, sexually repressive era and a ‘liberated’, post-68 
era, whereas in fact both consist in an incitement to talk the truth about sexuality.  
Already in this early critique of “the grandiloquence of a discourse purporting to speak 
the truth about sex,”92 we can discern the intertwining of truth and power that Foucault 
develops over the subsequent years in a historically more comprehensive study of the 
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‘hermeneutics of the subject’. Central to the medical and psychiatric constitution of ‘the 
homosexual’ in the nineteenth century were practices in which subjects at once confessed 
their desires to a person claiming medical authority while having their confession inter-
preted as ciphers about the subject’s deepest desires, which were taken as their innermost 
essence. These 19th century practices can be traced to early Christian monastic regimes 
and the medieval obligation of confession: their many differences notwithstanding, Fou-
cault understands them as modifications of pastoral power, which is defined by 
“knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.”93 Now, sexual liberation goes 
awry when reduced to talking freely about desires: in that case, the normalizing demand 
to ‘tell the truth about oneself’ that defined 19th century medicine and psychiatry — the 
spheres where the subject of desire is constituted — is mistaken for an act of liberation. In 
other words, sexual liberation, if it is limited to uncensored acts of speaking of one’s inner 
desires, presupposes and hence reproduces the very notion of a subject of desire, which 
is problematic because it was first constituted in pastoral power. This means that Foucault 
fosters a deep “distrust [of] the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the 
problem of ‘Who am I’ and ‘What is the secret of my desire?’”94 In other words, the claim 
of a group identity on the basis of one’s desires relies on a problematic hermeneutics of 
the subject that is complicit in the normalization of sexuality. 
This leads him to assert that the main challenge posed by gay culture is “the homosex-
ual mode of life, much more than the sexual act itself.”95 Whereas the latter refers to the 
transgression of sexual norms, the former points at the more interesting question of the 
development of a gay culture, where culture (as Foucault defines the term in another con-
text) consists in the “hierarchical organization of values [that] calls on the individual to 
engage in regular, costly, and sacrificial conduct that orientates his whole life” and does 
so “through regular and reflected techniques.”96 This culture is a collective endeavour, 
and the cultivation of a gay lifestyle cannot be bracketed from the practices, sexual and 
otherwise, that are regularised sites of interaction.97  
Hence, the potential of the gay movement lies not in claiming an identity and liberating 
one’s desire from social repression but in developing lifestyles that experiment with pleas-
ure. Pleasure, in contradistinction from desire, is a limit experience that allows subject to 
transgress their own boundaries, and one that is, furthermore, not delimited by the object 
towards which it is directed (as in the case of desire) but open-ended because of the man-
ifold bodily sensations of which we are capable. Foucault suggests that the experiment 
with these pleasures can also be the nucleus of a practice in which we develop new forms 
of coexistence:98 new, affective bonds that are irreducible to the heteronormative concep-
tions of romantic (straight) relationships and platonic (same-sex) friendship. For these 
novel relationships, Foucault deploys the term friendship. Through sexual practices and 
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the pleasures and affection these engender, one can engage in relations that have not been 
institutionalized. What is more, these relationships can bring about bonds between indi-
viduals who otherwise belong to different social strata. “Homosexuality,” he writes,  
“is a historic occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, not so much through 
the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual but because the ‘slantwise’ position of the latter, 
as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social fabric allow these virtualities to 
come to light.”99 
Starting from the body as a site of pleasure, friendship cuts across the social stratification 
of age, class and ethnicity, bringing about new, ‘diagonal’ communities. Like Arendt (her 
omission of bodily pleasure notwithstanding), Foucault discerns in affective relationships 
the potential to counteract the isolating and individualizing dynamics of late-modern so-
ciety. The multiplication of relationships traversing society defies the differentiation and 
segregation of social groups brought about by governmental techniques of control. How-
ever, this account of friendship falls short in thematizing the encounter with the other. 
This deficit is brought up by Johanna Oksala in her otherwise approving reading of Fou-
cault. Drawing on Levinas, she argues, “[the] other makes ethical subjectivity possible, 
but also breaks the totality of constituted experience by introducing a plurality in being 
that resists all efforts of totalization and normalization.”100 This rupture introduced by the 
other is precluded in Foucault’s ethics as he asserts (in an enigmatically brief comment) 
that “The care of the self is ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontolog-
ically prior.”101 Oksala makes her point by comparing Foucault to Levinas, but a compar-
ison with Arendt would have likewise brought out this limitation. After all, like Levinas, 
Arendt suggests that the relation to the other precedes that with the self, and more im-
portantly, the presence of others, with whom one acts in concert, is the condition for bring-
ing about truly new modes of being that are irreducible to the objectives of ethical perfec-
tion by any one of the agents.102 Thus, the question arises as to what extent friendship, as 
Foucault understands it, really opens up a space of self-formation by the unexpected en-
counter with the unfathomable other. 
This impression is confirmed when we shift to his historical inquiry into pederasty.103 
This fairly institutionalized practice does not provide a blueprint for contemporary erotic 
friendships. Rather, he is interested in the way that the pederastic relationship poses an 
ethical problematic for those engaging in it, in that the attitude of erastes and eromenos was 
the object of intense scrutiny and concern. Foucault’s interest in this practice has to do, 
firstly, with dislodging our contemporary conception of desire, which is marked (and thus 
marks the subject) by the gender and acts of what is desired. In the ancient Greek concep-
tion, one is not defined by whom or what one desires but the attitude one cultivates to-
wards pleasures; of which, secondly, those connected to sexual acts form just one sphere 
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of sensations among others (and by no means a privileged one). These observations are 
particularly helpful in forging a gay culture that tries to break away from the identity that 
is imposed on them and that is reproduced in the call for liberation. Furthermore, they are 
helpful for envisioning a lifestyle in which sexual acts are important but not the exclusive 
ethical substance.104 The historical study of the subject of desire is instrumental, he be-
lieves, to the gay community’s objective to open up the field of possible ways of being: it 
requires “[digging] deeply to show things have been historically contingent, for such and 
such a reason intelligible but not necessary”105 – a specific instance, in other words, of the 
critical attitude of Enlightenment that revolves on “work on our limits, that is, a patient 
labor giving form to our impatience for liberty.”106  
To argue, as I did above, that friendship should be thematized to account for the en-
counter with the other is not to argue that all friendships should conform to that exclusive, 
Aristotelean ideal that Arendt proposes. Foucault should be praised for validating these 
‘friendships of pleasure,’ which have been dismissed historically, and integrating them 
into a modern-day, aestheticized and highly singular notion of a good life. A future syn-
thesis of his unfinished account of friendship with that of Arendt’s would, for instance, 
stress the unexpected pleasures that are both bodily as well as, in a more platonic sense, 
emerge from ‘the pleasure of their company’107 – pleasures, that is, that defy any logic of 
self-mastery while allowing for the invention of one’s unique mode of living.108 Such a 
yet-to-be-written account would have the additional benefit of relieving his ethics from 
the confines of a reflexive praxis of self-government. 
CONCLUSION 
Arendt and Foucault are the vigilant observers of late-modernity, spurring us into action 
to change the present that is the product of historically contingent processes. What role 
does philosophy play in these acts of resistance? Arendt’s response would be more dis-
missive than Foucault’s, and that is no doubt due to her restrictive conception of philoso-
phy. She would be mindful of the philosopher’s bias in favour of the solitary, reflexive 
experience of thinking at the expense of the collective freedom to determine the conditions 
under which we life. This is not to say that philosophy and ethics — fields that are closely 
related for both Arendt and Foucault — do not have any political relevance, but rather 
that they are driven by and restricted to a concern for the self. Although Foucault attends 
to the collective dimension of resistance, he privileges the work on one’s limits, which 
bars an acknowledgement of the irreducibly singular and unique other in such works of 
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self-transformation. Yet, resistance, as both authors are well aware, provides an exhilarat-
ing moment of relating to others, thus defying the very individualizing effects of late-
modern governmentality. The promise of this encounter and of the contestation of the 
status quo matches their fears for the many dangers awaiting us.  
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